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ABSTRACT

The Bulk Electric System (BES) in the United States includes transmission lines of 100kV
and above, transformers of 100kV and above on Low Voltage (LV) side and generating units that
step up to 100 kV and above. The BES is a power network that connects different states and utility
companies via tie lines for exchange of Power. [1]
To maintain the integrity of power systems, it is very important to keep the BES intact and
for that the regulatory authority, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), has
developed over 100s of reliability standards and is responsible to enforce them.
During the past several years, the U.S has experienced power system instability events in
which a fault occurred on one part of a system and travelled through the entire interconnection.
Some of the extreme events are a major concern for power systems in the U.S that consists of
Cascading, Uncontrolled Separation and natural disasters damaging the transmission circuits.
Protection System plays important role towards the stability of power systems, but most
important aspect of protection system is the Critical Fault Clearing Time. This case study focused on
the Critical Fault Clearing Time enhancement by making a comparison between a Gang Operated
(GO) and Independent Pole Operated (IPO) Breaker. An extreme event was considered as a fault
scenario for the case study that consisted of three phase fault followed by breaker failure scenario.
PSS®E 33.9 software was used to perform dynamic study on three different power plants to
show the comparison between GO breaker and IPO breaker. A tremendous improvement was
achieved using IPO breaker with more than 100% increase in Critical Fault Clearing Time.
vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of Power Systems in the United States
Power systems in The United States are very complex and reliable. North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) is an International regulatory authority in the U.S to enforce
reliability standards on all the Transmission owners, Generator owners, Transmission Service
Providers, Distribution providers, Reliability coordinators, Balancing Authorities and other
functional entities in the United States and Canada for the reliability and security of Bulk Electric
System (BES). Bulk Electric System comprises of all the transmission circuits (100 kV and above),
transformers (LV winding of 100 kV or above) and generators connected to 100 kV and above. All
NERC standards are enforceable on BES equipment. [1]
There are three major interconnections in the U.S which are made up of interconnected
grids in certain geographical areas. They are mentioned below.
•

Eastern Interconnection.

•

ERCOT (The Electric Reliability Council of Texas) Interconnection.

•

Western Interconnection.[2]
These major interconnections work independently but limited power can be transferred

from one major interconnection to the other. Every utility company in an interconnection are
connected to the other within the same interconnection via tie lines for transfer of power. This type
of interconnected power system is very rigid and efficient but there is a possibility that if a fault
1

occurs on one part of the system, it might cause instability problems in some other parts of the
system, which leads to extreme events causing Instability, Uncontrolled separation or Cascading. In
order to avoid uncontrolled separation, system instability and cascading, the protection system has
to be very substantial.
1.2 Instability Event that Occurred in the State of Florida
The state of Florida has experienced major instability events in the past which resulted in
loss of generation/load. The following event is described briefly to give an overview of stability
issues under consideration.
As per Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC) report on System Disturbance and
Under Frequency Load Shed (UFLS) Event on February 26, 2008, a fault was developed at 138 kV
switch located at one of Miami’s Substations in Florida. The fault propagated due to long fault
clearing time of 1.7 seconds, triggering the Under-Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS)scheme and
shed a load of 2273 MW in the state of Florida. Due to this fault, suppressed voltages caused two
nearby generating units tripped, resulting in generation unit’s loss of 2500 MW and additional 1800
MW generation loss in the rest of the state.
This whole situation took 10 seconds during which the whole state of Florida experienced
severe Frequency, voltage and power surges. The frequency was swinging between 59.38 Hz to 60.4
Hz causing power system disturbance and instability [3].
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CHAPTER 2
PROCESS OF ENHANCING CRITICAL FAULT CLEARING TIME

2.1 Introduction
This chapter explains the process of enhancing Critical Fault Clearing (CFC) time and why it
is important to do so. Power systems stability can be improved tremendously by considering system
improvements in it. The scope of this thesis includes extreme events that consists of three-phase
fault on a 230 kV transmission circuit, connected to a 230 kV bus which is connected to a
generation substation, followed by breaker failure situation which makes this fault scenario an
extreme event as per TPL-001 standard of NERC. Due to extreme event, the power system could
face catastrophic instability issues. The major instabilities under observation during the simulations
are explained in the next section.
2.2 Types of System Instabilities
In order to assess the system instability, this thesis will focus on instability, uncontrolled
separation and cascading which are major instability issues described below.
2.2.1 Instability
As per NERC proposed glossary of terms for IROLs, Instability is defined as,
“The inability of Elements of Bulk Power System, for a given initial operating condition, to regain a
state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a Disturbance”.[4]
In order to assess instability during PSS®E simulations considering extreme event condition,
the following parameters will be observed.
3

•

Load/Generation loss.

•

Rotor angle instability causing any generator to lose synchronism.

•

The number of BES transmission circuits tripped during the offline study.

•

The type of load tripped (e.g. sensitive load or nuclear plants).

•

The Under Frequency Load Shed (UFLS) post fault.

2.2.2 Uncontrolled Separation
As per NERC proposed glossary of terms for IROLs, Uncontrolled Separation is defined as,
“The unintended islanding of a portion of the Bulk Power System that includes generation or
load”.[4]
In order to assess uncontrolled separation during dynamic simulations, the following parameters will
be assessed.
i. Uncontrolled separation refers to islanding of a portion of Bulk power system that includes
generation or load which is separated due to the mis-operation of protection system.
ii. The frequency and voltage of the BES busses will be monitored against severe frequency and
voltage dips caused by transient instability.
2.2.3 Cascading
As per NERC proposed glossary of terms for IROLs, cascading is defined as,
“The uncontrolled successive loss of Bulk Power System Elements triggered by a Disturbance”.[4]
There are two types of cascading explained in the NERC Reliability guideline,
i. Bounded Cascading
It is a type of cascading that stops after removing certain number elements from the system.
This type of cascading brings no harm to the rest of the Bulk Power System but a small load pocket
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or some generation is removed from the system and the system readjusts itself to the steady state
condition.
ii. Unbounded Cascading
It is a type of cascading that cannot stop the subsequent removing of elements from the
Bulk Power System. The system enters into an unstable condition in which the fault escalates to a
certain point after removing tremendous number of elements from Bulk Power System.
2.3 Critical Fault Clearing Time
The critical fault clearing time is the total time, during which if a system is subject to
disturbance and the fault is cleared within that that time duration, the system will remain stable once
the fault is isolated. If the fault is isolated beyond the critical fault clearing time, it could lead to
system instabilities in the form of generation/load loss. The total fault clearing time is different for
different parts of power systems. It mainly depends on the protection settings and type of protection
system used. For transmission substation with no generating unit directly connected to it, the critical
fault clearing time is usually longer than it is at a generation substation. The following figure explains
Total Fault Clearing Time.[5]
In this thesis, “~” sign has been used to show electrical cycles.

5

Figure 1 Total clearing time diagram
* This figure has been modified and taken from conference paper “Experience with Local Breaker
Failure Relay Protection” by Albert N. Darlington and Thomas W. Patrick at page 3.
Considering fast protection system, the above figure shows the protection settings for local
breaker failure scenario. When a fault occurs, it typically takes 1~ for a protective relay to detect the
fault. It typically takes 2~ for a circuit breaker at the power plant substation to operate, while for
transmission (non-generation) substation, the circuit breaker interrupt time is typically 3~. When the
relay senses the fault, it sends trip command to the circuit breakers in its zone of protection and at
the same time, the breaker failure timer starts. At the end of breaker failure timer time, if current is
still flowing through any of the local breakers, a breaker failure has occurred. In order to clear the
fault, the breaker failure relay sends trip commands to all backup breakers. The fault detector reset
time is set based on the slowest breaker interrupt time of the substation. The total fault clearing time
for breaker failure might be longer for a transmission (non-generation) substation.[6]
2.4 Components of Normal Fault Clearing Time
The typical time components for relay, transfer trip and circuit breaker assumed for running
the simulations are given below.
6

Table 1 Normal Fault Clearing Time
Protection System

Local End (cycles)

Remote End (cycles)

Relay Time

1~

1~ (at local end)

Transfer Trip Time

Not Applicable

1~

Circuit Breaker Interrupt Time

2~

3~

Total (Normal Fault Clearing Time)

3~

5~

The normal fault clearing time at local end is 3~ as the fault occurs in its zone 1. At the remote
end, as the fault is not in its zone, the local end relay time (1~) is counted towards clearing the fault
from remote end. The normal fault clearing time at remote end is 5~ which includes 1~ relay time at
local end, 1~ transfer trip time and 3~ remote end circuit breaker interrupt time. As the remote end
is a non generation substation, the circuit breaker interrupt time considered is 3~.
2.5 System Operating Limits
The System Operating Limits (SOL) for each BES facility in the United States are
established following the NERC Standard FAC-008-3. The SOLs are established mainly by
considering the facility ratings of generators, transmission circuits, protection system and
transformers for a particular facility. The most limiting element is set up as System Operating Limit
for that facility.[7]
2.5.1 Voltage Limits
The protection settings against off nominal voltage considered for this thesis are explained in
the voltage ride through curve below. The curve is designed for 60 Hz frequency.
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Voltage Ride Through Curve

1.4

Voltage (pu)

1.2
1

No Trip Zone

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Time (s)

3

3.5

4

High Voltage Duration
Low Voltage Duration

Figure 2 Voltage ride through curve
* This figure has been modified and originally taken from NERC’s Standard PRC-024-2 “Generator
Frequency and Voltage Protection Relay Settings” at page 8.
The blue curve shows high voltage duration while the orange curve shows low voltage
duration. This curve considers cumulative time of the voltage excursion limits (upper and lower
limits) which means if for instance the voltage is 0.85pu for less than 3 seconds, it is forbidden to
trip. If the cumulative time of the voltage excursion falls outside the curve, it is allowed to trip.
2.5.2 Frequency Stability Limits
For the simulations, there is an Under-Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) program, which
operates its first step of shedding load when the frequency drops down to 59.6 Hz to mitigate the
under-frequency condition. If the frequency continues to drop down, further Load Shedding steps
will be activated and will shed more load to mitigate the under-frequency condition.

8

Frequency limits vs time curve
62.5
62

Frequency

61.5
61
60.5

No Trip Zone

60
59.5
59
58.5
58
57.5
1

10

Time (s)

100

1000
High Frequency Duration
Low Frequency Duration

Figure 3 Frequency limits vs time curve
* This figure has been modified and originally taken from NERC’s Standard PRC-024-2 “Generator
Frequency and Voltage Protection Relay Settings” at page 10.
The blue curve shows high frequency duration for generating units while the orange curve
shows low frequency duration for generators. If the frequency goes beyond its standard limits (high
or low) for a time duration that will make it fall outside the curve, it is allowed to trip the generating
unit. As long as any generating unit frequency limit for certain period of time stays inside the curve,
it is forbidden to trip.
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CHAPTER 3
SETTING UP PSS®E SOFTWARE FOR DYNAMIC SIMULATIONS

3.1 Overview
To run dynamic study simulations, PSS®E 33.9 by SIEMENS software is used in this thesis
to achieve the objective.
Many Utility companies in the United States use PSS®E software to run steady state and
dynamic simulations. To set up PSS®E 33.9 software base case, all the utility companies have to
follow NERC Standard MOD-032-1. The purpose of MOD-032-1, as defined in the standard, is,
“To establish consistent modelling data requirements and reporting procedures for development of
planning horizon cases necessary to support analysis of the reliability of the interconnected
transmission system”.[8]
In this chapter, a step by step process of PSS®E set up, simulations and results retrieval is
briefly explained. To set up a base case for PSS®E, a wide range of data is required as per NERC
MOD-032-1 standard.
3.2 Setting Up the Base Case for Simulations
The base case is set up using the existing sample cases in the PSS®E library. Modifications
are made to the sample cases by altering or adding necessary data to it. The base case is set up
following the requirement R1 of the NERC standard MOD-032-1 which explains the details to be
included in the model that is data format, level of detail to which equipment shall be modelled and
case types or scenarios to be modelled.[8]
10

The PSS®E 33.9 GUI Users Guide gives instructions on how to set up the base case. [9]
3.2.1 Types of Database
There are mainly two types of databases used for Dynamic simulations. The two types are
briefly explained below.
i. Network Data
Network data is used for power flow studies. It contains the data of whole network which
includes transmission (impedance, voltages (peak and off peak), loading (normal and emergency),
length of line, operational status of circuit), generation (active power, reactive power, voltage (peak
and off peak)), load ( MW and MVAR), fixed shunt, switched shunt and transformers (2-windings
and 3-windings). The Network data saved file has an extension of (.sav).
ii. Dynamic Data
Dynamic data contains detailed data of generators which includes type of generator (Salient
pole or round rotor), exciter, turbine governor and stabilizer. It also contains the UFLS (Under
Frequency Load Shed) program and some line relay models. The dynamic data file is called a
snapshot file and is saved with an extension (.snp).
3.3 Sequence Thevenin Impedance Data
To perform dynamic simulations for GO and IPO breaker, the sequence Thevenin
impedance data is required. The fault study under consideration for dynamic simulations is three
phase fault which is a balanced fault and requires positive sequence Thevenin impedance only. A
high inductance shunt is used at the point of three phase fault. As IPO breaker has separate
operating mechanism for each pole, the assumptions used for simulations for a breaker failure is that
only one pole fails to operate. In this situation, three-phase fault is converted into a single line to

11

ground fault due to one stuck pole. As single line to ground fault is an unbalanced fault, it requires
positive, negative and zero sequence Thevenin impedance data.
To calculate Thevenin sequence impedance, a short circuit data bank case is used to run
automatic sequencing fault calculation in PSS®E which provides fault current and sequence
Thevenin impedance. The busses under consideration are selected. The following settings are
selected.

Figure 4 Automatic sequence fault calculation settings
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The sum of negative and zero sequence resistance and reactance are converted into per unit
values with 100 MVA base as shown in formula.
R (pu) = (100MVA/230kV^2) * R (ohms)
The per unit values of resistance and reactance are converted into MW and MVAR
respectively to be used as shunt at the point of single line to ground fault in the simulations using
the following formula.
X

G = (100MVA/!R2 +X2 )* cos ( tan-1 R ) MW
X

B = - (100MVA/!R2 +X2 )* sin ( tan-1 R ) MVAR
The value of B is negative because negative value of MVARs show inductance. The
following table shows negative and zero sequence Thevenin impedance for the three busses under
consideration for simulation.
Table 2 Sequence Thevenin impedance data

Substation

Bus Name

(kV)

Negative Sequence

Zero Sequence

Negative + Zero

Thevenin

Thevenin

Sequence Thevenin

SLG Shunt

Impedance

Impedance

Impedance

(MVA)

R

X

R

X

R

X

G

B

(Ohms)

(Ohms)

(Ohms)

(Ohms)

(pu)

(pu)

(MW)

(MVAR)

Pakistan

230

0.22417

2.65899

0.14818

2.21734

0.0007039

0.0092180

824

-10785

GoBulls

230

0.17642

2.26732

0.17957

1.91255

0.0006729

0.0079015

1070

-12565

Bravo

230

0.18602

2.60588

0.25393

3.06702

0.0008317

0.0107238

719

-9269
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3.4 Procedure to Run Dynamic Simulations
The step by step procedure followed to perform simulations for this thesis is as follows.
3.4.1 Loading the Base Case and Setting Up the Channels Wizard
The network saved case (.sav) is loaded first and then dynamic data is loaded by opening the
snap file (.snp).
Channel wizard is set up before dynamic simulations are run. The channel contains the
parameters selected for output channel. The parameters (Rotor angle, Bus Voltage, Bus frequency,
Load (MW and MVAR), Generator Terminal Voltage, Generator mechanical power, speed of rotor)
and the selected busses that will be monitored during simulations. All 230 kV transmission lines and
BES generators will be monitored for any type of instability. The Channel wizard set up is shown
below.
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Figure 5 Channel wizard settings
3.4.2 Setting Up Dynamic Simulations Options
The dynamic simulation options are set up before the simulations are run, keeping in mind
the parameters discussed in this thesis to monitor instability. The four main parameters to be
monitored for instability are rotor angle, electrical power, frequency and voltage. The settings for
dynamic simulation options are shown in the figure below.

15

Figure 6 Dynamic simulation settings
3.4.3 Performing Dynamic Simulations
The network and dynamic data files are loaded. The channel output file is created and then
the system is initialized and run to 6~ to ensure flat pre-disturbance conditions. A fault is applied at
6~ (0.1s) for all the simulation cases. Depending on the case, different fault duration is applied to
the cases until the critical fault clearing time is found after multiple simulations run. The total
simulation run time is 5 seconds. A log file is created which contains informational messages from
the simulation. An output file is generated which contains all the quantities for different channels.
The dynamic simulation settings are shown below.
16

Figure 7 Performing dynamic simulations settings
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CHAPTER 4
CASES AND SIMULATION RESULTS

4.1 Overview
The process discussed in Chapter 2 is implemented in this chapter to find instability,
uncontrolled separation and cascading. This chapter is based on the results of simulations. Three
power plants are considered with different generating units, excitation systems, protection settings
and different network to which they are connected. An extreme event (as per TPL-001 standard by
NERC) is considered for all the three power plants in which a three-phase fault occurs at one of the
transmission circuits connected to a 230 kV generation substation, followed by a breaker failure.
There are several cases explained in this chapter in the following sections to show
tremendous improvement in power system stability by enhancing Critical Fault Clearing Time.
4.2 Types of Approaches Used for Simulations
There are two main approaches used. In first approach, a GO (Gang Operated) breaker is
used while in the second approach IPO (Independent Pole Operated) breaker is used.
4.2.1 Approach 1
The first approach used is based on Gang Operated (GO) circuit breakers. In GO circuit
breaker, one operating mechanism is used for all the three poles. A GO circuit breaker is considered
to run dynamic simulations after a three-phase fault occurs on 230 kV transmission circuit followed
by breaker failure. The critical fault clearing time would be found by running the simulations for
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multiple fault durations (1~ increments) while monitoring the log and output files for any loss of
synchronism.
4.2.2 Approach 2
The second approach used is based on Independent Pole Operated (IPO) circuit breakers.
IPO breakers have separate operating mechanism for every pole. It means that if a three phase fault
occurs on a transmission circuit followed by breaker failure (with only one pole stuck assumption),
only one pole would fail to operate while the other two poles would operate normally. The separate
mechanism for each pole operates every pole independently from the other. In this approach, three
phase fault occurs on 230 kV transmission circuit followed by breaker failure scenario (one stuck
pole assumption). Due to IPO breaker, the three phase fault is converted to a single line to ground
fault right after the normal fault clearing time at the local end. The critical fault clearing time would
be found by running the simulations for multiple fault durations (1~ increments) while monitoring
the log and output files for any loss of synchronism.
4.3 Cases and Results
4.3.1 Case 1 – Fulbright Power Plant
Consider a Power Plant called “Fulbright” which is connected to a 230 kV Substation
Pakistan via GSU (Generation Step Up) transformer. The generation capacity of power plant is 1632
MW. The two ST (Steam Turbine) units have IEEET1 exciter system while the CTs (Combustion
Turbines) have ESST4B exciter system. All the CTs have active Turbine Governor and Stabilizer
features as well.
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The unit details are given in the following table.
Table 3 Fulbright power plant unit details
Fulbright Power Plant
Unit
Type of Turbine
Power (MW)
Name Plate
(MVA)
Terminal (kV)
FB_1ST
Steam
236
256
20
FB_2ST
Steam
308
495
22
FB_CT1A
Combustion
152
211
18
FB_CT1B
Combustion
152
211
18
FB_CT1C
Combustion
152
211
18
FB_CT2A
Combustion
158
211
18
FB_CT2B
Combustion
158
211
18
FB_CT2C
Combustion
158
211
18
FB_CT2D
Combustion
158
211
18
Total
1632
2228

Inertia (s)
3.76
3.11
5.26
5.26
5.26
5.26
5.26
5.26
5.26

The power plant is connected to a 230 kV substation called “Pakistan” that has total
eighteen 230 kV transmission circuits. There are nine transmission circuits capable of exporting
power to the grid.
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The bus/branch diagram from PSS®E is given below.

Figure 8 Bus/Branch diagram of 230 kV Pakistan substation
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This power plant has the station service load connected to the LV (Low Voltage) bus of
GSU (Generator Step Up) transformer as shown in the bus/branch diagram of one of the units.

Figure 9 LV (Low Voltage) bus of Fulbright power plant

The 230 kV circuit (Pakistan – Mountain) carried the maximum load of 491 MVA. A threephase fault occurred on this circuit followed by breaker failure.
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The bus/branch diagram showing the fault is given below.

Figure 10 Bus/Branch diagram of 230 kV Pakistan substation with three phase fault

4.3.1.1 Critical Fault Clearing Time Using Approach 1 for Case 1
A three-phase fault occurred at 230 kV Pakistan-Mountains circuit right outside the fence of
230 kV Pakistan substation. The fault location was very close to the 230-kV Pakistan bus. As the
fault was in zone 1 of 230 kV Pakistan bus, it took 1~ for the relay to sense the fault and 2~ for the
breakers to operate. The remote end (230 kV Mountain) breaker operated in 5~. The GO breaker at
Pakistan end failed to operate. But in order to clear the fault from local end, the breaker failure relay
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sent trip signal to back up breakers. It was observed that for a total fault clearing time of 14~, all
units remained in synchronism as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11 Rotor angles of Fulbright power plant units with GO breaker at 14~

For a total fault clearing time of 15~, Fulbright 1ST lost synchronism as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12 Rotor angles of Fulbright power plant with GO breaker at 15~
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The rotor angles comparison of Fulbright 1ST for a total fault clearing time of 14~ and 15~
is given below.

Figure 13 Rotor angles comparison of Fulbright 1ST with GO breaker scenario
The electrical power comparison for total fault clearing time of 14~ and 15~ is given below.
If the fault stays on the system for 15~, Fulbright 1ST loses synchronism.

Figure 14 Electrical power comparison at Fulbright 1ST Unit with GO breaker scenario
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The voltage at 230kV Pakistan bus for total fault clearing time of 14~ and 15~ with GO
breaker is given below.

Figure 15 Voltage at 230 kV Pakistan substation with GO breaker scenario

The frequency at 230 kV Pakistan Substation for total fault clearing time of 14~ and 15~
with GO breaker is given below. According to this graph, the frequency does not drop down to 59.6
Hz to trigger UFLS (Under Frequency Load Shed).

Figure 16 Frequency at 230 kV Pakistan substation with GO breaker scenario
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4.3.1.2 Critical Fault Clearing Time Using Approach 2 for Case 1
A three-phase fault occurred at 230 kV Pakistan-Mountains circuit right outside the fence of
230 kV Pakistan substation. The fault location was very close to the 230 kV Pakistan bus. The fault
was followed by breaker failure situation but in this case only one pole of the breaker failed to
operate while the other two poles of the phases operated normally. It took 1~ for the relay to detect
fault, 2 ~ for the circuit breaker to operate in its zone 1. It took 5~ to clear the fault from remote
end which is 230 kV Mountains substation. In the case of an IPO breaker, the three-phase fault is
converted to a single line to ground fault due to one stuck pole and none of the units lost
synchronism due to single line to ground fault as shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17 Rotor angles of Fulbright power plant units with IPO breaker at 200~

The electrical power at Fulbright 1ST unit is given below. The electrical power curve of
Fulbright ST1 curve is shown because it is the least stable unit and lost synchronism in case of GO
breaker failure. The single line to ground fault stayed on the system for 200~ and none of the units
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lost synchronism. When the fault was applied, the electrical power dropped down to almost zero. A
small amount of electrical power from the generator was fed to the auxiliary load and GSU losses
during the fault. At 200~, the fault was cleared and there was 60% increase in the electrical power.

Figure 18 Electrical power at Fulbright 1ST with IPO breaker at 200~

The voltage at 230kV Pakistan bus is given below. When the three phase fault occurred, the
positive sequence voltage went down to zero. An IPO breaker with one stuck pole clears two phases
of the fault from local end which brings the positive sequence voltage from zero up to 0.63 pu. With
a single line to ground fault remaining on the system for 200~, none of the units lost synchronism.
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Figure 19 Voltage at 230 kV Pakistan substation with IPO breaker at 200~

The frequency at 230 kV Pakistan substation with IPO breaker is given below. The
frequency did not drop down to 59.6 Hz to trigger UFLS.

Figure 20 Frequency at 230 kV Pakistan substation with IPO breaker at 200~
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4.3.2 Results for Case 1
The results for GO and IPO breakers were compared for 230 kV Pakistan substation, and
IPO breakers gave the best results. The comparison is shown below.
Table 4 Comparison of GO and IPO breaker for 230 kV Pakistan substation
Gang Operated Breakers

Independent Pole Operated Breakers

Critical Fault Clearing Time = 14 ~

Critical Fault Clearing Time = >200~

At 15 ~, Fulbright 1ST lost synchronism

At 200~, none of the units lost
synchronism

4.3.3 Case 2 – GoBulls Power Plant
Consider a Power Plant called “GoBulls” which is connected to a 230 kV Substation
GoBulls. The generation capacity of power plant is 1767 MW. It consists of four STs (Steam
Turbines) and one CT (Combustion Turbine). The four ST units have IEEET1 Exciter system while
the CT has AC exciter system. The turbine governor feature is active for unit GoBulls 1 & 2 while
the others do not have that feature. None of the units have Stabilizer feature active. The unit details
are given in the following table.
Table 5 GoBulls Power Plant unit details
GoBulls Power Plant
Units
GoBulls 1
GoBulls 2
GoBulls 3
GoBulls 4
GoBulls CT4

Type of Turbine
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Combustion
Total

Power (MW) Power (MVA)
410
410
420
470
57
1767

495
495
495
540
82
2107
30

Terminal Voltage
(kV)
24
24
22
22
13.8

Inertia (s)
2.94
2.94
2.74
2.30
1.55

The power plant is connected to a 230-kV substation called “GoBulls” which has fourteen
230 kV transmission circuits. There are five circuits which are directly connected to the GoBulls
Power Plant while the other nine are 230 kV transmission circuits capable of exporting power to the
grid. The PSS®E bus/branch diagram is given below.

Figure 21 Bus/Branch diagram of 230 kV GoBulls substation
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This power plant has the station service load connected to the LV (Low Voltage) bus of
GSU (Generator Step Up) transformer as shown in the diagram of one of the units.

Figure 22 LV bus of GoBulls power plant
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The 230 kV circuit (GoBulls – Broadway) carried the maximum load of 439 MVA. A threephase fault occurred on this circuit followed by breaker failure. The bus/branch diagram showing
the fault is given below.

Figure 23 Bus/Branch diagram of 230 kV GoBulls substation with 3 phase fault

4.3.3.1 Critical Fault Clearing Time Using Approach 1 for Case 2
A three-phase fault occurred at 230 kV GoBulls-Broadway circuit right outside the fence of
230 kV GoBulls substation. The fault location was very close to the 230-kV GoBulls bus. As the
fault was in zone one of 230 kV GoBulls bus, it took 1~ for the relay to sense the fault and 2~ for
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the breaker to operate. The remote end (230 kV Mountain) breaker operated in 5~. The GO breaker
at GoBulls end failed to operate. But in order to clear the fault from local end, the relay sent trip
signal to back up breakers. It was observed that at 11~ total fault clearing time, all units remained in
synchronism as shown in figure 24.

Figure 24 Rotor angles of GoBulls power plant units with GO breaker at 11~
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At 12~ total fault clearing time, GoBulls 4 unit lost synchronism. The rotor angles for total
fault clearing time of 12~ are shown below.

Figure 25 Rotor angles of GoBulls power plant with GO breaker at 12~
The rotor angles comparison of GoBulls 4 unit for total fault clearing time of 11~ and 12~
are given below.

Figure 26 Rotor angles comparison of GoBulls 4 unit with GO breaker scenario
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The electrical power comparison for 11~ and 12~ total fault clearing time is given below. If
the fault stays on the system for 12~, GoBulls 4 unit loses synchronism along with 907.2 MW of
UFLS.

Figure 27 Electrical power comparison of GoBulls 4 unit with GO breaker scenario
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The voltage at 230kV GoBulls bus for total fault clearing time of 11~ and 12~ is given
below.

Figure 28 Voltage at 230 kV GoBulls substation with GO breaker scenario
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The frequency at various distribution substation went below 59.6 Hz triggering stage 1 of
UFLS program, shedding a load of 907.2 MW. However, the frequency at GoBulls substation went
down to 59.7 Hz as shown below.

Figure 29 Frequency at 230 kV GoBulls substation with GO breaker scenario
4.3.3.2 Critical Fault Clearing Time Using Approach 2 for Case 2
A three-phase fault occurred at 230kV GoBulls-Broadway circuit right outside the fence of
230 kV GoBulls substation. The fault location was very close to the 230 kV GoBulls bus. The fault
was followed by breaker failure situation but in this case only one pole of the breaker failed to
operate while the other two poles of the phases operated. It took 1~ for the relay to detect fault, 2~
for the circuit breaker to operate in its zone 1. It took 5~ to clear the fault from remote end which is
230 kV Broadway substation.
In the case of an IPO breaker, the three-phase fault is converted to a single line to ground
fault due to one stuck pole and none of the units lost synchronism due to single line to ground fault
as shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 30 Rotor angles of GoBulls power plant units with IPO breaker at 200~
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The electrical power of GoBulls 4 unit is given below. The electrical power of GoBulls 4 is
shown because it is the least stable unit as compared to others and lost synchronism in the case of
GO breaker. When the fault occurred, the electrical power dropped down to almost zero. A small
amount of electrical power from the generator was fed to the auxiliary load and GSU losses during
the fault. At 200~, the fault was cleared and there was 60% increase in the electrical power.

Figure 31 Electrical power at GoBulls 4 unit with IPO breaker at 200~

The voltage at 230kV GoBulls bus is given below. When the three phase fault occurred, the
positive sequence voltage went down to zero. An IPO breaker with one stuck pole clears two phases
of the fault from local end which brings the positive sequence voltage from zero up to 0.63 pu. With
a single line to ground fault remaining on the system for 200~, none of the units lost synchronism.
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Figure 32 Voltage at 230 kV GoBulls substation with IPO breaker at 200~
The frequency at 230 kV GoBulls substation is given below. There was not any UFLS
observed during simulations as the frequency dip went to 59.8 Hz.

Figure 33 Frequency at 230 kV GoBulls substation with IPO breaker at 200~
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4.3.4 Results for Case 2
The results for GO and IPO breakers were compared for 230 kV GoBulls Substation and
IPO breakers gave the best results. The comparison is shown below.
Table 6 Comparison of GO and IPO breaker for 230 kV GoBulls substation
Gang Operated Breakers

Independent Pole Operated Breakers

Critical Fault Clearing Time = 11~

Critical Fault Clearing Time >200~

At 12~, GoBulls 4 unit tripped with 907.2 MW
At 200~, none of the units lost synchronism

Load Shed

4.3.5 Case 3 – Bravo Power Plant
Consider a Power Plant called “Bravo” which is connected to 230kV Bravo Substation. The
generation capacity of this Power Plant is 1401 MW. It consists of five Combustion Turbine (CT)
units and two Steam Turbine (ST) units. Bravo CT1, CT2, CT3 and ST1 has same exciter system of
EXST1 with no active turbine governor and stabilizer feature. Bravo CT4 has an exciter system of
EXST1 with no active Turbine governor and Stabilizer feature. Bravo ST2 has an exciter system of
ESST1A with active Stabilizer feature and no Turbine governor feature. The details of each unit are
given in the following table.

42

Table 7 Bravo power plant unit details
Bravo Power Plant
Unit
Bravo CT1
Bravo ST1
Bravo CT2
Bravo CT3
Bravo CT4
Bravo CT5
Bravo ST2

Type of Turbine Power (MW) Power (MVA)
Combustion
Steam
Combustion
Combustion
Combustion
Combustion
Steam
Total

170
120
152
152
152
152
503
1401

229
154
195
195
234
234
570
1811

Terminal Voltage (kV)
18
13.8
18
18
18
18
24

Inertia
(s)
4.8
3.5
5.8
5.94
4.83
4.83
3.8

The power plant is connected to a 230-kV substation called “Bravo” which has twelve (12)
230 kV circuits. There are seven circuits connected to Bravo Power Plant, while the other five are
transmission circuits capable of exporting power to the grid.
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The bus/branch diagram is given below.

Figure 34 Bus/Branch diagram of 230 kV Bravo substation
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This power plant does not have station service load connected to the LV (Low Voltage) bus
of GSU transformer as shown in the bus/branch diagram of one of the units.

Figure 35 LV bus of Bravo power plant
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The 230 kV circuit (Bravo – Spain) carried the load of 341 MVA. A three-phase fault
occurred on this circuit followed by breaker failure. The bus/branch diagram showing the fault is
given below.

Figure 36 Bus/Branch diagram of 230 kV Bravo substation with fault
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4.3.5.1 Critical Fault Clearing Time Using Approach 1 for Case 3
A three-phase fault occurred at 230 kV Bravo-Spain circuit right outside the fence of 230 kV
Bravo substation. The fault location was very close to the 230-kV Bravo bus. As the fault was in
zone one of 230 kV Bravo bus, it took 1~ for the relay to sense the fault and 2~for the breaker to
operate. The remote end (230 kV Spain) breaker operated in 5~. The GO breaker at Bravo end
failed to operate. But in order to clear the fault from local end, the relay sent trip signal to back up
breakers to clear the fault. It was observed that for a total fault clearing time of 10~, all units
remained in synchronism as shown in figure 37.

Figure 37 Rotor angles of Bravo power plant units with GO breaker at 10~
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For a total fault clearing time of 11~, Bravo ST2 unit lost synchronism as shown below.

Figure 38 Rotor angles of Bravo power plant with GO breaker at 11~

The rotor angle comparison for Bravo ST2 unit is given below for a total fault clearing time
of 10~ and 11~.

Figure 39 Rotor angles comparison of Bravo ST2 unit with GO breaker scenario
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The electrical power comparison of Bravo ST2 unit for a total fault clearing time for 10~
and 11~is given below.

Figure 40 Electrical power comparison of Bravo ST2 with GO breaker scenario

The voltage at 230kV Bravo bus is given below for a total fault clearing time of 10~ and
11~.

Figure 41 Voltage at 230 kV Bravo substation with GO breaker scenario
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The frequency at 230 kV Bravo substation for the total fault clearing time of 10~ and 11~ is
given below.

Figure 42 Frequency at 230 kV substation Bravo with GO breaker scenario

4.3.5.2 Critical Fault Clearing Time Using Approach 2 for Case 3
A three-phase fault occurred at 230kV Bravo-Spain circuit right outside the fence of 230 kV
Bravo substation. The fault location was very close to the 230-kV Bravo bus. The fault was followed
by breaker failure situation but in this case only one pole of the breaker failed to operate while the
other two poles of the phases were normal. It took 1~ for the relay to detect fault, 2~ for the circuit
breaker to operate but one of the poles did not operate. It took 5~ to clear the fault from remote
end which is 230 kV Spain substation. In the case of an IPO breaker, the three-phase fault is
converted to a single line to ground fault due to one stuck pole and none of the units lost
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synchronism due to single line to ground fault. It was observed that for a total fault clearing time of
35~, all units remained in synchronism as shown in figure 43.

Figure 43 Rotor angles of Bravo power plant units with IPO breaker at 35~

The rotor angles of Bravo power plant for a total fault clearing time of 36~ are given below.
For a total fault clearing time of 36~. Bravo ST2 unit lost synchronism. It is the least stable unit as
compared to the others.
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Figure 44 Rotor angles of Bravo power plant with IPO breaker at 36~
The rotor angle comparison of Bravo ST2 unit for 35~ and 36~ is shown below.

Figure 45 Rotor angles of Bravo ST2 unit with IPO breaker scenario

The electrical power comparison of Bravo ST2 unit for 35~ and 36~ is given below. The
electrical power restored quickly when the fault was cleared from remote end.
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Figure 46 Electrical power comparison of Bravo ST2 unit with IPO breaker scenario
The voltage at 230kV Bravo bus is given below. When the three phase fault occurred, the
positive sequence voltage went down to zero. An IPO breaker with one stuck pole clears two phases
of the fault from local end which brings the positive sequence voltage from zero up to 0.63 pu. With
a single line to ground fault remaining on the system for 35~, none of the units lost synchronism.

Figure 47 Voltage at 230 kV Bravo substation with IPO breaker scenario
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The frequency at 230 kV Bravo substation is given below. The frequency does not go
beyond 59.6 Hz to trigger UFLS.

Figure 48 Frequency at 230 kV Bravo substation with IPO breaker scenario
4.3.6 Results for Case 3
The results for GO and IPO breakers for 230 kV Bravo Substation were compared and IPO
breakers gave the best results. Bravo Power plant is less stable as compared to the other two cases
because it has less transmission circuits capable of exporting power. The comparison is shown
below.
Table 8 Comparison of GO and IPO breaker for Bravo power plant
Gang Operated Breakers

Independent Pole Operated Breakers

Critical Fault Clearing Time = 10 EC

Critical Fault Clearing Time = 35 EC

At 11 EC, Bravo ST2 lost synchronism

At 36 EC, Bravo ST2 lost synchronism

Total Improvement in Stability: Critical Clearing Time Enhanced from 10~ to 35~ = 250%
Enhancement in Critical Clearing Time
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The Bulk Electric System has a very dense network of 230 kV transmission circuits. This
thesis was based on a study to make comparison between Gang Operated and Independent Pole
Operated circuit breakers using extreme event scenario. An extreme event condition was considered
to analyze the power system stability during worst case scenarios. Three different power plants were
considered for simulations using PSS®E software. The power plants had different units with
different types of excitation system and power network to which they were connected to see the
variation in results.
PSS®E software was used to perform dynamic study. The extreme condition considered was
a three phase fault on a transmission circuit, very close to the 230 kV substation directly connected
to the power plant, followed by breaker failure situation. The same fault was applied to those three
different power plants to determine the critical fault clearing time for GO and IPO breakers. A
comparison was made between the results simulated for GO and IPO breakers to show
improvement in stability.
Depending on the characteristics of generating units and the network they are connected to,
all the three power plants showed different results. In the three simulation cases, Independent Pole
Operated breakers showed tremendous improvement in stability when compared with Gang
Operated breakers.
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5.1 Recommendation
Independent Pole Operated (IPO) breakers showed outstanding improvement in enhancing
critical fault clearing time. It is highly recommended that if any new breaker is installed in a
generation substation, it should be an IPO breaker for better stability results. Also, if any Gang
Operated (GO) breaker needs to be replaced at a generation substation due to increased available
fault current, it should be replaced with an IPO breaker for better stability results.
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